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Introduction 
This chapter seeks to bring togetheƌ tǁo of ‘oďeƌt ‘eiŶeƌ͛s keǇ ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶs to poliĐe studies – his 
research on Chief Constables and news-media representation of policing. Chief Constables (1991) 
pƌeseŶted a tǇpologǇ of Đhief offiĐeƌs, ͚a poǁeƌful elite gƌoup of gƌoǁiŶg iŵpoƌtaŶĐe͛,  which took 
account of prevailing socio-political and law and order conditions at the time. This was the moment 
when the heated public debate on policiŶg pƌoduĐed the fiƌst ͚ĐeleďƌitǇ Đops͛. He ĐoŶstƌuĐted fouƌ 
ideal types of police chief: the baron; the bobby; the boss and the bureaucrat, all with distinct 
ideological orientations. He ĐoŶĐluded that the ͚ďuƌeauĐƌatiĐ͛ ŵode ǁas the futuƌe, displaĐiŶg the 
other types. In this chapter, we propose an addition to ‘eiŶeƌ͛s typology – the mediatised police 
chief, who is subject to unprecedented 24/7 news media scrutiny, criticism and, if deemed necessary 
by an increasingly adversarial press, ͚tƌial ďǇ ŵedia͛. 
There is surprisingly little research on the relations between the news media and police chiefs. It is 
possible, however, to extrapolate from more general studies of news media-police relationships, and 
to adapt and develop the theoretical frameworks they employed. Two concepts have featured to 
ǀaƌǇiŶg degƌees aĐƌoss the eǆistiŶg ƌeseaƌĐh: ͚iŶfeƌeŶtial stƌuĐtuƌes͛ ;LaŶg aŶd LaŶg, ϭϵϱϱͿ aŶd 
͚hieƌaƌĐhǇ of ĐƌediďilitǇ͛ ;BeĐkeƌ, ϭϵϲϳͿ. LaŶg aŶd LaŶg ;ϭϵϱϱͿ deǀeloped the ĐoŶĐept of ͚iŶfeƌeŶtial 
stƌuĐtuƌes͛ to eǆplain how the same political news content could be constructed into multiple 
configurations, establishing selectively representative frameworks of understanding that shaped 
how both newsmakers and audience interpreted the story. Ultimately, what they viewed as 
jouƌŶalists͛ ͚uŶǁittiŶg ďias͛ Đould ͚iŶflueŶĐe puďliĐ defiŶitioŶs iŶ a paƌtiĐulaƌ diƌeĐtioŶ͛ ;LaŶg aŶd 
Lang, 1955: 171). Whilst Lang and Lang (1955) did not consider the unequal influence of news 
souƌĐes iŶ estaďlishiŶg aŶd ŵaiŶtaiŶiŶg ͚iŶfeƌeŶtial stƌuĐtuƌes͛, BeĐkeƌ͛s ;ϭϵϲϳͿ ͚hieƌaƌĐhǇ of 
ĐƌediďilitǇ͛ faĐilitated a ŵoƌe ideologiĐal ƌeadiŶg of defiŶitioŶal poǁeƌ. His ŵodel pƌoposes that iŶ 
aŶǇ soĐietǇ it is takeŶ foƌ gƌaŶted that goǀeƌŶiŶg elites haǀe the ƌight ͚to defiŶe the ǁaǇ thiŶgs ƌeallǇ 
aƌe͛ ;ϭ967: 240). Since the attribution of credibility and authority are intimately connected with the 
ŵoƌes of a soĐietǇ, this ďelief has a ͚ŵoƌal ƋualitǇ͛ ;BeĐkeƌ, ϭϵϲϳ: ϮϰϬͿ.  
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These concepts influenced a few key studies in the 1970s concerned with how the unequal 
distribution of news media access and attention, the ideological orientation of journalists and 
sources, and the politicisation of law and order all ĐoŶtƌiďuted to the ƌepƌoduĐtioŶ of ͚doŵiŶaŶt 
ideologǇ͛ ;ChiďŶall, ϭϵϳϳ; Hall et al, ϭϵϳϴ; see also Halloran et al., 1970). For Hall et al (1978), news 
reporting of crime and justice was shaped by elite sources who collectively represent and command 
institutional power – those at the top of BeĐkeƌ͛s ;ϭϵϲϳͿ ͚hieƌaƌĐhǇ of ĐƌediďilitǇ͛. The poliĐe ǁeƌe 
viewed as stƌuĐtuƌallǇ aŶd ĐultuƌallǇ adǀaŶtaged iŶ estaďlishiŶg the doŵiŶaŶt ͚iŶfeƌeŶtial stƌuĐtuƌe͛ – 
oƌ ͚pƌiŵaƌǇ defiŶitioŶ͛ iŶ Hall et al͛s ;ϭϵϳϴͿ teƌŵs – that subsequently set the agenda for future 
debate. Contemporaneous evidence suggested that, whilst the police perspective might be 
contested, the asymmetry of power in the communication process meant that it could rarely be 
meaningfully challenged, still less altered fundamentally. Subsequent studies confirmed, albeit less 
deterministically, the police as the key definitional force in setting the crime news agenda (Ericson et 
al, ϭϵϴϵ, ϭϵϵϭ; SĐhlesiŶgeƌ aŶd Tuŵďeƌ, ϭϵϵϰͿ. Chief poliĐe offiĐeƌs, as ͚authoƌised kŶoǁeƌs͛, ǁeƌe 
fouŶd to haǀe aŶ espeĐiallǇ pƌiǀileged positioŶ ǁithiŶ the ͚hieƌaƌĐhǇ of ĐƌediďilitǇ͛.  
͚IŶfeƌeŶtial stƌuĐtuƌes͛ aŶd ͚hieƌaƌĐhǇ of ĐƌediďilitǇ͛ haǀe all ďut disappeaƌed fƌoŵ ƌeseaƌĐh on news 
media and policing, though they remain entirely pertinent given the conceptual trajectory of much 
recent work. In the US context, for example, Manning (2001) has noted the tendency for the news 
ŵedia to alloĐate ĐeleďƌitǇ status to ͚ďig ĐitǇ͛ poliĐe Đhiefs. He goes oŶ to deŵoŶstƌate hoǁ, iŶ a 
Đultuƌe iŶfatuated ǁith sĐaŶdal aŶd ͚speĐtaĐle politiĐs͛, headliŶe-gƌaďďiŶg ͚ĐeleďƌitǇ͛ poliĐe Đhiefs 
can be built-up and knocked-down by the news media in dramatic and newsworthy fashion. William 
Bratton is probably the paradigmatic example, not just in the USA but globally, of the celebrity police 
chief (see Bratton, 1998). In the UK context, Loader and Mulcahy (2001a: 42) have conceptualised 
Đhief poliĐe offiĐeƌs as ͚Đultuƌal ageŶts͛ ǁith the sǇŵďoliĐ poǁeƌ to ͚oǁŶ͛, ͚fƌaŵe͛ oƌ ͚ĐoŶtƌol͛ 
paƌtiĐulaƌ issues iŶ the ͚puďliĐ iŶteƌest͛ ;see also ‘eiŶeƌ, ϮϬϬϬͿ. However, as Loader and Mulcahy 
(2001a, b) also recognise, contemporary UK police chiefs face an altogether more complicated task 
when engaging with a multi-mediated public realm. Two notable consequences have resulted. First, 
increased awareness that negative media coverage can undermine public confidence in policing has 
driven extensive investment in risk communication strategies designed to advantage the police 
perspective in news coverage (Mawby, 2002; Chermak and Weiss, 2005; McLaughlin, 2007). Second, 
a generation of British chief police officers has traded public prominence for political power. The 
͚elite poliĐe ǀoiĐe͛ iŶ the UK has ďeeŶ Đoƌpoƌatized ;Loadeƌ aŶd MulĐahǇ, ϮϬϬϭď: ϮϱϵͿ. As a ƌesult, 
the outspoken, opinionated police chief has, in theory, been replaced by the politically cautious, 
managerialist CEO.  
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We would suggest that these professional and political transformations have been paralleled by 
equally significant shifts within the news media. The combined influence of these shifts has been to 
increase the likelihood that the police institution and police chiefs will be subject to intense and 
critical journalistic scrutiny. In the following sections, we map out some of these key 
tƌaŶsfoƌŵatioŶs, aŶd ďoth ƌeǀiǀe aŶd ƌesituate the ĐlassiĐ ĐoŶĐepts of ͚iŶfeƌeŶtial stƌuĐtuƌes͛ aŶd 
͚hieƌaƌĐhǇ of ĐƌediďilitǇ͛ ǁithiŶ the ĐoŶteǆt of aŶ eǀolǀiŶg Ϯϰ-7 global news mediasphere. The aim is 
to construct a theoretical framework within which contemporary news media-police relations can be 
researched, and  the ͚tƌial ďǇ ŵedia͛ of chief police officers can be understood.  
 
New Contexts: Re-Theorising News Media-Police Chief Relations  
Contemporary police chiefs must operate within an information-communications environment that 
differs radically from the more stable and predictable conditions conceptualised in previous research 
by Robert Reiner. The most important dimension of this multi-faceted environment is the 
emergence of the 24-7 news mediasphere. A proliferation of news platforms, sites and formats has 
precipitated a digitised convergence of moving images, text, sound and archive. This shift has been 
paƌalleled ďǇ ͚aŶ eǆplodiŶg aƌƌaǇ of Ŷeǁs souƌĐes, oƌ producers of content͛ ;Paǀlik, ϮϬϬϴ: ϳϵ, 
emphasis in original; Deuze, 2008; Fenton, 2009). Heightened competition places a premium on 
quick-fire news, personalisation and exclusivity, ǁhiĐh ƌuptuƌes distiŶĐtioŶs ďetǁeeŶ: ͚ŵaiŶstƌeaŵ͛ 
aŶd ͚taďloid͛; ͚haƌd͛ aŶd ͚soft͛ Ŷeǁs; ͚Ŷeǁs͛ aŶd ͚eŶteƌtaiŶŵeŶt; aŶd ĐaŶ disƌupt the tƌaditioŶal Ŷeǁs 
ŵedia oƌieŶtatioŶ toǁaƌd the estaďlished ͚hieƌaƌĐhies of ĐƌediďilitǇ͛.  
Second, the pluralisation and pƌofessioŶalisatioŶ of possiďle souƌĐes of ͚poliĐiŶg Ŷeǁs͛ has Đƌeated a 
ŵultipliĐitǇ of alteƌŶatiǀe ͚kŶoǁledge ǁoƌkeƌs͛ ;EƌiĐsoŶ aŶd HaggeƌtǇ, ϭϵϵϳ: ϭϵͿ ǁith aĐĐess to 
poteŶtiallǇ ͚ŶeǁsǁoƌthǇ͛ iŶfoƌŵatioŶ that ŵaǇ oƌ ŵaǇ Ŷot Đoƌƌespond with an ͚official͛ police 
peƌspeĐtiǀe. The diǀeƌsifiĐatioŶ of ͚poliĐe ǀoiĐes͛ ŵakes it harder to communicate a coherent and 
authoritative police viewpoint and, therefore, more difficult to establish a dominant police-driven 
͚iŶfeƌeŶtial stƌuĐtuƌe͛ iŶ the Ŷeǁs ŵedia.  
Third, whilst news commentaries on the police historically came from a small group of specialist 
journalists (Chibnall, 1977; Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994; Reiner, 2000), today political editors, 
features writers, columnists and commentators are all enthusiastic in venturing their opinions. This 
expansion and diversification can partly be explained by the slashing of news budgets and the 
requirement for senior staff and lead commentators to develop their portfolios across a broader 
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range of topics (Mawby, 2010). But it is also, we would suggest, connected with wider cultural 
change.  
The widely cited decline in confidence and trust in institutional authority (Beck, 2006; Fukuyama, 
ϮϬϬϬ; DogaŶ aŶd Seid, ϮϬϬϱͿ is ŵaŶifested iŶ the eŵeƌgeŶĐe of ǁhat ǁe teƌŵ a ĐǇŶiĐal ͚politics of 
outƌage͛ (Greer and McLaughlin, 2011b). This ͚politiĐs of outƌage͛ is siŵultaŶeouslǇ eǆpƌessed aŶd 
amplified in an increasingly adversarial news media. Market-driven newspapers, particularly in the 
UK, are inclined to initiate and support anti-establishment campaigns and protests, and can draw 
from an unprecedented array of both professional and amateur news sources to do so. Adherence 
to a defeƌeŶtial ͚iŶfeƌeŶtial stƌuĐtuƌe͛, ƌeiŶfoƌĐiŶg estaďlished ͚hieƌaƌĐhies of ĐƌediďilitǇ͛, does Ŷot 
ďoost ƌeadeƌship sales. The pƌoŵotioŶ of adǀeƌsaƌial ͚iŶfeƌeŶtial stƌuĐtuƌes͛ aŶd the ŵaŶufaĐtuƌe of 
dissent does (Milne, 2005; Protess et al, 1991; Sabato, 1993; Sabato et al, 2000; Lloyd, 2004; Barnett, 
ϮϬϬϮͿ. WheŶ Ŷeǁs ŵedia adǀeƌsaƌialisŵ aŶd the ͚politiĐs of outƌage͛ ĐoalesĐe iŶ a suffiĐieŶtlǇ 
coherent and ĐolleĐtiǀe ŵaŶŶeƌ, ƌoutiŶe ͚attaĐk jouƌŶalisŵ͛ ĐaŶ eǀolǀe iŶto full-blown ͚tƌial ďǇ 
ŵedia͛.  
 
Trial by Media  
In previous research we have defined ͚tƌial ďǇ ŵedia͛ as a dǇŶaŵiĐ, iŵpaĐt-driven, news media-led 
process by which individuals – who may or may not be publicly known – are tried and sentenced in 
the ͚Đouƌt of puďliĐ opiŶioŶ͛ (Greer and McLaughlin, 2011a, 2011b) . The targets and processes of 
͚tƌial ďǇ ŵedia͛ ĐaŶ ďe diǀeƌse, aŶd ŵaǇ ƌaŶge fƌoŵ pƌe-judging the outcome of formal criminal 
proceedings agaiŶst ͚uŶkŶoǁŶs͛ to the ƌeleŶtless puƌsuit of high-profile celebrity personalities and 
public figures deemed to have offended in some way against an assumed common morality. We 
have suggested, hoǁeǀeƌ, that despite theiƌ diǀeƌsitǇ, suĐh ͚tƌials͛ shaƌe Đeƌtain core characteristics. 
In each case, the news ŵedia ďehaǀe as a pƌoǆǇ foƌ ͚puďliĐ opiŶioŶ͛ aŶd seek to eǆeƌĐise paƌallel 
fuŶĐtioŶs of ͚justiĐe͛ to fulfil a ƌole peƌĐeiǀed to lie ďeǇoŶd the iŶteƌests oƌ Đapaďilities of foƌŵal 
institutional authority . Due process and journalistic objectivity can give way to sensationalist, 
moralising speculation about the actions and motives of those who stand accused in the news media 
spotlight. JudiĐial sĐƌutiŶǇ of ͚haƌd eǀideŶĐe͛ Ǉields gƌouŶd to ͚ƌeal tiŵe͛ disseŵiŶation of disclosures 
fƌoŵ paid iŶfoƌŵaŶts aŶd heaƌsaǇ aŶd ĐoŶjeĐtuƌe fƌoŵ ͚ǁell plaĐed souƌĐes͛. SiŶĐe the Ŷeǁs ŵedia 
substitute for the prosecution, judge and jury, the target may find themselves rendered defenceless. 
The default ͚iŶfeƌeŶtial stƌuĐtuƌe͛ is ͚guiltǇ uŶtil pƌoǀeŶ iŶŶoĐeŶt͛. OŶĐe ĐƌǇstallised, this iŶfeƌeŶtial 
stƌuĐtuƌe eŶsuƌes that the ͚guiltǇ͛ ǁill ďe suďjeĐted to ƌighteous ͚ŶaŵiŶg aŶd shaŵiŶg͛ folloǁed ďǇ 
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carnivalesque condemnation and ridicule (cf Bahktin, 1968). The result, as our analysis of former 
MPS Commissioner Siƌ IaŶ Blaiƌ͛s ͚tƌial ďǇ ŵedia͛ ĐleaƌlǇ deŵoŶstƌated ;Gƌeeƌ aŶd MĐLaughliŶ, 
2011a), can be deep and lasting reputational damage. This form of mediatised punishment is 
ĐhaƌaĐteƌised ďǇ ͚gƌotesƋue ƌealisŵ͛ aŶd ͚ƌeleŶtless saǀageƌǇ͛ ;HuttoŶ, ϮϬϬϬ: ϯϬͿ. It aŵouŶts to a 
puďliĐ eǆeĐutioŶ iŶ the ͚soĐietǇ of the speĐtaĐle͛ ;Deďoƌd, ϭϵϳϬͿ. The puďliĐ appeal of ͚tƌial ďǇ ŵedia͛ 
is evidenced by increased circulation and web traffic. Our central argument, then, is that the 
transformations outlined above have coalesced to create a highly adversarial, volatile and interactive 
news mediasphere within which authorities and elites must increasingly struggle against the flow of 
news media opinion to maintain a positive public profile.  
In this Đliŵate, the ͚elite poliĐe ǀoiĐe͛ ŵust ĐoŶtiŶuallǇ Đoŵpete to ďe heaƌd aďoǀe the Đlaŵouƌ of 
ŵǇƌiad otheƌ ͚Đƌediďle͛ ǀoiĐes, eaĐh ǀǇiŶg to asseƌt theiƌ oǁŶ ǀeƌsioŶs of ƌealitǇ oƌ positioŶs oŶ 
crime, justice and policing issues. Past research indicated that, because of their privileged position in 
the ͚hieƌaƌĐhǇ of ĐƌediďilitǇ͛, the poliĐe ǁeƌe adǀaŶtaged iŶ estaďlishiŶg the doŵiŶaŶt ͚iŶfeƌeŶtial 
stƌuĐtuƌe͛ iŶ Đƌiŵe aŶd justiĐe ƌepoƌtiŶg: iŶ shoƌt, the poliĐe ƌoutiŶelǇ set the Đƌiŵe Ŷeǁs ageŶda. 
Today, we would suggest that the official police position is often one of reaction, attempting to 
regain the initiative and respond to information flows that are simply beyond their control. Where 
oŶĐe the poliĐe ǁeƌe Đƌiŵe Ŷeǁs ͚gatekeepeƌs͛ ;EƌiĐsoŶ et al, ϭϵϵϭͿ, ͚patƌolliŶg the faĐts͛, theǇ aƌe 
Ŷoǁ ͚Đƌiŵe Ŷeǁs stakeholdeƌs͛, just oŶe gƌoup aŵoŶg ŵaŶǇ – and a fragmented one at that – 
iŶǀolǀed iŶ aŶ oŶgoiŶg aŶd uŶĐeƌtaiŶ pƌoĐess of ͚ŶegotiatiŶg the faĐts͛. Wheƌe oŶĐe the poliĐe ǁeƌe 
the key players in a process of ͚ageŶda settiŶg͛, theǇ aƌe Ŷoǁ paƌt plaǇeƌs iŶ aŶ altogetheƌ ŵoƌe 
Đoŵpleǆ aŶd uŶpƌediĐtaďle pƌoĐess of ͚ageŶda ďuildiŶg͛ ;LaŶg aŶd LaŶg, ϭϵϴϯͿ.  
In the following sections, we shed further analytical light on the changing nature of news media-
police chief relatioŶs, aŶd the ƌisiŶg Ŷeǁs ŵedia ͚politiĐs of outƌage͛, ďǇ aŶalǇsiŶg the ͚tƌial ďǇ ŵedia͛ 
that defiŶed Siƌ Hugh Oƌde͛s atteŵpt to ďeĐoŵe CoŵŵissioŶeƌ of the MPS iŶ August/Septeŵďeƌ 
2011.  
 
The Poisoned Chalice: the Commissionership of Scotland Yard 
Sir Ian Blair was the first MPS Commissioner to contend with the transformed political and news 
media environment discussed above. Like his predecessors, Blair had to transact the politics of 
poliĐiŶg ǁith the Hoŵe OffiĐe, Heƌ MajestǇ͛s IŶspeĐtoƌate of CoŶstaďulary (HMIC), national and 
force-speĐifiĐ poliĐe pƌessuƌe gƌoups, as ǁell as DoǁŶiŶg Stƌeet, LoŶdoŶ͛s politiĐal estaďlishŵeŶt 
and public pressure groups. However, the constitutional landscape that Blair encountered was 
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further complicated by the creation of the Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA) – which in turn 
augmented the role of the Mayor of London and the Greater London Authority – and the  
establishment of the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC). Blair thus had to navigate a 
largely uncharted and unpredictable politicised network of complex, mediatised interests. After two 
years of a relentless, increasingly personalised ͚tƌial ďǇ ŵedia͛, Siƌ IaŶ Blaiƌ͛s ƌesigŶatioŶ fiŶallǇ Đaŵe 
on 2
nd
 October 2008. 
Ouƌ ƌeseaƌĐh iŶdiĐated that Siƌ IaŶ Blaiƌ͛s ͚tƌial ďǇ ŵedia͛ did ŵoƌe thaŶ de-legitimise one particular 
Commissioner (Greer and McLaughlin, 2011a). It laid down a clear symbolic marker about what 
͚tǇpe͛ of CoŵŵissioŶeƌ aŶd poliĐiŶg philosophǇ is aĐĐeptaďle in contemporary Britain, and 
deŵoŶstƌated the poǁeƌ of the ƌisiŶg Ŷeǁs ŵedia ͚politiĐs of outƌage͛. SeĐtioŶs of the pƌess ǁeƌe 
antagonistic towards Blair because of what he represented – a paƌtiĐulaƌ ďƌaŶd of ͚politiĐallǇ ĐoƌƌeĐt͛ 
(New Labour) policing at a time when conservative and tabloid commentators were demanding a 
tougheƌ ͚laǁ aŶd oƌdeƌ͛ ƌespoŶse to ͚BƌokeŶ BƌitaiŶ͛. UltiŵatelǇ, hoǁeǀeƌ, eǀeŶ Blaiƌ͛s ŵedia 
suppoƌteƌs fouŶd his positioŶ iŶdefeŶsiďle. Foƌ his ĐƌitiĐs, the ͚good ƌiddaŶĐe͛ depaƌtuƌe of ͚Neǁ 
Laďouƌ͛s faǀouƌite poliĐeŵaŶ͛ ǁas a ǀiĐtoƌǇ. But a suĐĐessful ͚tƌial ďǇ ŵedia͛ ƌeƋuiƌed ŵoƌe thaŶ a 
ƌesigŶatioŶ: to deŵoŶstƌate uŶeƋuiǀoĐallǇ the Ŷeǁs ŵedia͛s supƌeŵaĐǇ iŶ the Đouƌt of puďliĐ 
opinion, Blair had to be publicly humiliated. Newspapers used the same striking cropped image of a 
defeated and deflated Commissioner forced to announce his resignation in civilian clothing: stripped 
of offiĐe, stƌipped of uŶifoƌŵ, aŶd, iŶ the eǇes of his Ŷeǁs ŵedia ĐƌitiĐs, stƌipped of digŶitǇ. ͚UŶfit foƌ 
offiĐe͛ was the collective news media verdict, evidenced by a self-reinforcing loop of time-lines and 
slide shoǁs that ǁill illustƌate iŶ peƌpetuitǇ his ͚gaffe pƌoŶe͛ CoŵŵissioŶeƌship.  
Befoƌe his appoiŶtŵeŶt as Blaiƌ͛s suĐĐessoƌ ǁas ĐoŶfiƌŵed in January 2009, Sir Paul Stephenson 
underwent intense news media-vetting. In the end, and in sharp contrast to one of the other 
leading candidates, Sir Hugh Orde, Stephenson received the conditional endorsement of the 
Conservative and tabloid press as a welcome alternative to Blair, and a proven champion of 
͚ĐoŵŵoŶ seŶse͛ poliĐiŶg. On taking over as MPS Commissioner in January 2009, Stephenson had 
to do two things: assert his independence from a complex and volatile political environment, and 
distance himself from his pƌedeĐessoƌ͛s policing philosophy and media predilections (Evening 
Standard, 28
th
 January, 2009: 12):  
͚Siƌ IaŶ Blaiƌ did it his ǁaǇ aŶd I ǁas his loǇal deputǇ. Noǁ I ǁill do it ŵǇ ǁaǇ. I doŶ͛t ǁaŶt to 
ďe ďoƌiŶg. I doŶ͛t ǁaŶt to ďe eǆĐitiŶg. AŶd I doŶ͛t ǁaŶt to ďe a ĐeleďƌitǇ. I doŶ͛t ǁaŶt to ďe a 
police leader who people will follow out of a mere sense of curiosity. It is my aim to be a top 
poliĐe leadeƌ iŶ Đhaƌge of oŶe of the ŵost iŵpoƌtaŶt poliĐe seƌǀiĐes iŶ the ǁoƌld͛. 
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Sir Paul Stephenson͛s leadeƌship ǁas tested eaƌlǇ oŶ ǁith tǁo high pƌofile sĐaŶdals, ďoth of ǁhiĐh he 
survived. First, the MPS was accused by the Conservative Party of heavy-handedness and political 
policing in its investigation of alleged security leaks from the Home Office. On 28
th
 November 2008, 
while Stephenson was Acting Commissioner, Shadow immigration minister Damian Green was 
arrested oŶ suspiĐioŶ of ͚aidiŶg aŶd aďettiŶg ŵisĐoŶduĐt iŶ puďliĐ offiĐe͛ aŶd ͚ĐoŶspiƌiŶg to Đoŵŵit 
ŵisĐoŶduĐt iŶ a puďliĐ offiĐe͛ – the allegation was that Green had not simply received leaked 
iŶfoƌŵatioŶ, ďut had aĐtiǀelǇ ͚gƌooŵed͛ a Ciǀil SeƌǀaŶt to pƌoĐuƌe it ;Guardian, 28 November 2008). 
The arrest was viewed by conservatives and also some liberal commentators as politically motivated, 
and prompted speculation about why such a high profile collar should be authorised on the last day 
in office of outgoing MPS Commissioner Sir Ian Blair, duďďed ďǇ ĐoŶseƌǀatiǀes as ͚Neǁ Laďouƌ͛s 
faǀouƌite poliĐeŵaŶ͛. On 21 December 2008, tensions heightened when Assistant Commissioner  
Bob Quick accused the Conservative Party of trying to undermine the investigation. Quick retracted 
his statements and apologised. On 9 April 2009, in a highly embarrassing gaffe for the MPS and for 
Sir Paul Stephenson, Quick was forced to resign over his own security leak: he was photographed 
ĐaƌƌǇiŶg ͚seĐƌet͛ doĐuŵeŶts ĐoŶtaiŶiŶg details of a major counter terrorism operation, clearly visible 
to press photographers with telephoto lenses, iŶto the Pƌiŵe MiŶisteƌ͛s DoǁŶiŶg Stƌeet ƌesidence. 
On 16 April 2009, the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee criticised Home Office civil 
servants for prompting the MPS investigation by giving ͚an exaggerated impression of the damage 
done by the leaks that could reasonably be presumed to have emanated from the Home Office͛ 
(Home Affairs Committee, 2009). That same day, the Crown Prosecution Service announced that it 
was not going to bring a case against Damian Green or the civil servant who had allegedly leaked the 
information.  
Second, there was intense news media and political criticism of MPS public order policing tactics 
under Stephenson.  The heavy-handed policing of the G20 protests on 1 April 2009, resulting in the 
death of civilian bystander Ian Tomlinson after he was filmed being struck by a police officer, turned 
into a public relations disaster and a serious political problem for the MPS (Greer and McLaughlin, 
2010, 2011b). In November 2010 the force faced further criticism, this time because a ͚light touĐh͛ 
policing strategy – partly brought about by fears of another highly mediatised, fatal incident like 
Tomlinson – had underestimated the risk of public disorder associated with the student-fees 
protests. The police failed to halt student protestors attacking the Conservative party headquarters. 
Sir Paul Stephenson desĐƌiďed that poliĐe ƌespoŶse as ͚embarrassing͛, issued an apology to office 
workers, and informed his offiĐeƌs ͚I do Ŷot ǁaŶt this to happeŶ agaiŶ͛ . Then in December 2010, the 
MPS was criticised for security breaches which allowed student protesters to break into a Treasury 
building on Whitehall and attack a royal limousine carrying Prince Charles and the Duchess of 
8 
 
Cornwall thƌough LoŶdoŶ͛s West EŶd. Sir Paul Stephenson was forced to issue another apology, this 
time to Prince Charles, for the breakdown in communications. He also offered his resignation.  
 
Phone-hacking and Institutionalised Corruption: the De-Legitimation of Sir Paul Stephenson 
In August 2006 MPS detectives working on Operation Caryatid arrested the News of the World's 
royal editor, Clive Goodman, and private investigator, Glenn Mulcaire, over allegations that they 
hacked into the mobile phones of members of the royal household. In January 2007, Goodman and 
Mulcaire were jailed. Both defendants admitted conspiring to intercept communications, and  
Mulcaire also pleaded guilty to five other charges of intercepting voicemail messages. In July 2009 it 
emerged that News of the World reporters had illegally accessed messages from the mobile phones 
of celebrities and politicians. Assistant Commissioner John Yates, Boď QuiĐk͛s suĐĐessoƌ, said the 
MPS would not re-open the investigation into the allegations. However, in January 2011 the MPS 
was pressurised into establishing ͚OpeƌatioŶ WeetiŶg͛ to re-investigate the phone hacking scandal 
after celebrities and politicians continued to insist, with sustained and high profile news media 
coverage, that scores of phones had been hacked. As the story rolled on, questions were asked 
about why the MPS had not been more thorough in its pursuit of complaints against the News of the 
World. 
The phone hacking story exploded into a full-blown scandal during the first week of July 2011 when 
it emerged that it was not just celebrities, but ordinary members of the public – including crime 
victims, whose phones had been hacked. The Guardian (4 July) revealed that Glen Mulcaire had 
allegedly hacked into the mobile phone of Millie Dowler in 2002, before her body was found, and 
had both eavesdropped on messages left by her family and deleted messages. Deleting old messages 
had Đƌeated spaĐe iŶ Millie͛s ǀoiĐeŵail foƌ Ŷeǁ ŵessages, ǁhiĐh had given the family, who never 
stopped calling the number, false hope that she was still alive. It may also have hampered the police 
investigation by deleting potential evidence. This was already a sensitive case because of the callous 
manner in which the Dowler family had been treated by sections of the press during the trial of Levi 
Bellfield, who was convicted for murdering Millie Dowler in June 2011. The police had also had to 
apologise for blunders around this murder investigation. On July 5 the MPS revealed that the phones 
of other crime victims, including those involved in the July 2005 London Bombings, may also have 
been hacked. It became clear that the News of the World had been engaged in covert surveillance on 
an industrial scale. The storm of criticism triggered an emergency House of Commons debate on 6 
July, which called for a public inquiry into the extent and nature of journalistic phone hacking. News 
International stood accused of not only ignoring, but fostering a climate of normalised deviance and 
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systematic illegality. Equally significantly, the questionable conduct and role of the MPS was 
highlighted.  During the parliamentary debate three questions materialised: 
 Why did the first MPS investigation aĐĐept Neǁs IŶteƌŶatioŶal͛s position that phone hacking was 
limited to one ͚ƌogue ƌepoƌteƌ͛, given that they had in their possession 11,000 pages of evidence 
indicating that phone hacking was routinised?  Were bribes taken by only a handful of rogue officers or were corrupt relationships 
institutionalised?  How extensive and corrupt was the nature of the relationship between senior MPS officers and 
News International? 
We do not have space in this chapter to narrate the remarkable twists and turns as the unfolding 
News International phone hacking scandal and corruption allegations implicated Scotland Yard͛s 
highest ranks. Under increasing pressure to step down, and with a rapidly deteriorating position in 
the Ŷeǁs ŵedia ͚hieƌaƌĐhǇ of ĐƌediďilitǇ͛, Sir Paul Stephenson was presented by liberal and 
conservative commentators alike as ͚ƌesigŶed iŶ post͛. OŶ ϭϳ JulǇ, he announced his resignation. For 
StepheŶsoŶ the ͚eǀeƌǇdaǇ heƌoisŵ aŶd ďƌaǀeƌǇ͛ of MPS offiĐeƌs ǁas  ͚iŶ daŶgeƌ of ďeiŶg eĐlipsed ďǇ 
the on-going debate about relationships between senior officers and the media. This can never be 
right͛ (Guardian, 18 July 2011).  
The next day Assistant Commissioner John Yates resigned, following the decision of the 
Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA) to suspend him pending a referral to the Independent Police 
Complaints Commission (IPCC). Yates was due to reappear before an exceptional meeting of the 
Home Affairs Select Committee on the 19 July, along with Stephenson and Dick Fedorcio, Director of 
Public Affairs at MPS. On 18 July, the IPCC received four referrals relating to the MPS phone-hacking 
investigation involving Commissioner Sir Paul Stephenson, Mr Yates,  former Assistant Commissioner 
Andy Hayman, and former Deputy Assistant Commissioner Peter Clarke. A fifth referral related to 
the alleged involvement of Mr Yates in inappropriately securing a job at the MPS for the daughter of 
a friend. On 19 July 2011, the IPCC received a referral from the MPS regarding the relationship 
between Mr Neil Wallis and Dick Fedorcio, focusing on the circumstances under which the contract 
for senior level media advice and support contract was awarded to Chamy Media. 
On 18 July the Home Secretary, Theresa May, announced that she had appointed Elizabeth Filkin 
to examine relationships between the police and the news-media. This would be backed up by a 
separate inquiry by Her MajestǇ͛s IŶspeĐtoƌate of CoŶstaďulaƌǇ ;HMICͿ. At the same time she 
confirmed that the management board of the MPS had agreed a new set of guidelines relating to 
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police relationships with the news-media. On 20 July, Prime Minister David Cameron made a 
statement to Parliament detailing what would be done in the wake of the phone hacking scandal. 
One priority was the need to rebuild the leadership of the MPS and to root out police corruption. 
He argued that the police system was (Daily Telegraph, 24 July 2011): 
͚...too closed. There is only one point of entry into the force. There are too few – and 
arguably too similar – candidates for the top jobs. I want to see radical proposals for how 
we open our police force and bring in fresh leadership. We need to see if we can extend 
that openness to the operational side too. Why should all police officers have to start at the 
same level? Why should someone with a different skill set not be able to join the police  
force in a senior role? Why shouldn't someone, who has been a proven success overseas, 
be able to help tuƌŶ aƌouŶd a foƌĐe at hoŵe?͛ 
What is significant here is that the phone hacking scandal and its relentless coverage in the news 
media removed not only the Commissioner, but also an experienced senior officer who would have 
been a serious contender to replace him. In addition, the disclosure of the possibility of high level 
collusion with News International and the failure to recognise institutionalised  corruption reinforced 
the need for an outsider to be appointed as the new Commissioner. The Prime Ministeƌ͛s stateŵeŶt 
generated well-sourced speculation that Cameron wanted to bypass the normal Home Office 
appointment process and employ AŵeƌiĐaŶ ͚supeƌĐop͛ Bill Bratton to reform the MPS. On 22 July 
2011, the Metropolitan Police Authority placed aŶ adǀeƌtiseŵeŶt foƌ StepheŶsoŶ͛s ƌeplaĐeŵeŶt.  
This triggered intense news media conjecture regarding who the next Commissioner should/would 
be. Those profiled included: Tim Godwin, the Acting Commissioner; Bernard Hogan-Howe, the 
Deputy Commissioner;  Assistant Commissioner Cressida Dick;  Sarah Thornton, chief constable of 
Thames Valley Police; and Sir Hugh Orde, head of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO).  
 
Riots and Looting: the Legitimation of Bill Bratton – ͚SuperĐop͛. 
The issue of the vacant commissionership took an unexpected and dramatic turn as a result of the 
inquest into the appropriateness of the MPS response to the anti-police rioting and looting in 
London during 6-9 August 2011. As a result of an emergency Cobra meeting on 9 August, David 
CaŵeƌoŶ said the Ŷuŵďeƌ of poliĐe offiĐeƌs oŶ the stƌeets of LoŶdoŶ ǁould ͚suƌge͛ fƌoŵ ϲ,ϬϬϬ to 
16,000. The following day he took a ͚zeƌo toleƌaŶĐe͛ appƌoaĐh, declaring that water cannon would 
be available to the poliĐe ͚ǁithiŶ Ϯϰ houƌs͛, should they be needed to quell rioters, and said that the 
police were already authorised to use baton rounds. During an eŵeƌgeŶĐǇ ͚Laǁ aŶd Oƌdeƌ͛ sessioŶ 
of Parliament on 11 August, the sense that the MPS had lost control of the streets in parts of London 
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generated heavy political criticism of a humiliated force that was perceived as tactically incompetent 
and strategically leaderless. Because of poor management and poor decision-making, the Prime 
Minister had in effect been required to instruct the MPS to re-impose law and order.  
It was in the context of a debate about the power of LoŶdoŶ͛s ͚gaŶg Đultuƌe͛, the need for resolute 
policing methods, and the importance of demonstrating strong police leadership, that Bill BƌattoŶ͛s 
name re-emerged in the news media as Downing Street͛s preferred candidate for the MPS 
Commissionership. BƌattoŶ, as the ͚supeƌĐop͛ ǁho had pƌesided oǀeƌ the Neǁ Yoƌk ͚Đƌiŵe ŵiƌaĐle͛ 
aŶd ͚taŵed͛ the LA gaŶgs, now had the enthusiastic backing of the Conservative press. The self-
mythologising ͚superĐop͛ angle was amplified ďǇ BƌattoŶ͛s willingness to give interviews to the UK 
and US news media, stating that, if approached, he would seriously consider the position, and at 
least be prepared to act as a ͚gaŶg ďusteƌ͛ advisor to the British government. Conservative 
commentators urged the Prime Minister to overrule the Home office and police insistence that only 
British citizens could apply for the vacant Commissionership.  
 
Riots, Looting and Police Reform: the de-legitimation of Sir Hugh Orde 
In early July 2011 Sir Hugh Orde, as head of ACPO, had attempted to mobilise public opposition to 
the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s pƌoposed cuts in police budgets. He was derailed by the phone hacking scandal 
and needed to focus his attention on defending police integrity to a hostile and frenzied news 
media. Orde also became embroiled in a rancorous exchange of views over the policing of the riots, 
insisting on police primacy in the determination of tactics and dismissing the ͚supercop optioŶ͛ as 
͚stupid͛. The message Orde sent to Downing Street was uncompromising: the British police had 
nothing to learn from the United States, with its entrenched violent gang culture and very different 
approach to public order policing. Orde wrote a piece in the Independent (11 August 2011), arguing 
that riot tactics must be determined by chief constables rather than politicians, and that calls for the 
deployment of water cannon and plastic bullets was not necessary and would be counter-
productive. At this moment it was rumoured that a senior panel of Home Office officials were 
backing the appointment of this most visible, vocal and newsworthy police chief in England and 
Wales. 
Over the weekend of 12-14 August the row between the government and the police intensified over 
a series of controversial and pressing questions: who was to blame for the police͛s appaƌeŶt loss of 
control over the streets; who deserved credit for bringing the riots to an end; and what impact 
would the proposed cuts on the police budget have on the police capacity to maintain public order? 
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This weekend was also a ĐƌitiĐal tuƌŶiŶg poiŶt iŶ the ͚ƌaĐe foƌ the ĐoŵŵissioŶeƌship͛, when Sir Hugh 
Orde had an interview and profile in the Independent (13th August). Orde insisted that there was no 
connection between ministerial statements at the time of the riots and on-the-ground operational 
policing decisions, since politicians cannot instruct police chiefs in that way. ͚The fact that politicians 
chose to come back [from holiday]͛, he aƌgued, ǁas ͚an irrelevance in terms of the tactics that were 
by then developing. The more robust policing tactics you saw were not a function of political 
interference; they were a function of the numbers being available to allow the chief constables to 
ĐhaŶge theiƌ taĐtiĐs͛. 
Orde dismissed ͚ill-iŶfoƌŵed͛ politiĐal ĐoŵŵeŶts aŶd downplayed the importance of the riots and 
looting. He reiterated his criticism of the Pƌiŵe MiŶisteƌ͛s decision to float the name of Bill Bratton 
as a possible MPS Commissioner or government advisor on anti-gang initiatives, and warned about 
the risks associated with the coalition's spending cuts. At the same time, however, Bill Bratton was 
giving British press interviews in which he was ĐƌitiĐisiŶg ͚oǀeƌ-Đautious͛ poliĐe taĐtiĐs, and 
reaffirming his willingness to be considered as Commissioner and/or act as a government advisor. At 
the core of the disagreement between Orde and the government was the issue of operational 
independence of chief constables. In interviews given across the news media on 14 August, the 
Home Secretary reiterated her obligation to direct the police if it was deemed necessary. By the 15 
August, Bernard Hogan Howe, MPS Deputy Commissioner, and Steve House, Chief Constable of 
Strathclyde Police, were emerging from the shadows as the frontrunners to be the new MPS 
Commissioner. On August 17 2011, the job applicant deadline to fill the vacancy for the UK's most 
demanding police job expired. After the deadline had passed, the IPCC announced that there was no 
verifiable evidence of misconduct against Stephenson, Yates, Clarke and Haymen. Though the IPCC 
did register concerns about their professional judgement, neither Stephenson nor his senior 
colleagues would have been required to resign had they chosen to wait out the IPCC inquiry.  
What is remarkable aďout the seaƌĐh foƌ StepheŶsoŶ͛s ƌeplaĐeŵeŶt is that the news media had 
immediate access to the names, and possibly also the applications, of those who had applied: Sir 
Hugh Orde; Bernard Hogan-Howe; Tim Godwin; and Stephen House. IŶ light of Oƌde͛s outspoken 
criticism of Government and liberal policing philosophy, and despite vociferous support from the 
liberal press, the unanimous news media position was that either House or Hogan-Howe would 
succeed in being appointed. The inferential structure that was crystallising around Orde, and that 
was now being reproduced across tabloid and broadsheet, liberal and conservative newspapers 
alike, was that he had talked himself out of the position. That weekend the conservative press 
consolidated this inferential structure by subjecting Orde to a ͚trial by media͛ and publicly passing 
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judgement on his prospects. The other applicants in the contest for the MPS Commissionership were 
not subject to the same levels of media scrutiny, negative or otherwise. The Times (18 August: 2) 
began with an editorial arguing that the government should re-advertise the post if none of the 
candidates were deemed appropriate.  
͚The selection of a candidate with verve, imagination and willingness to change the 
organisation that he or she finds must be regarded as the objective. Among the applicants 
there may be many officers with a fine record and a reasonable expectation of selection. But if 
they do not possess the ability to combine this with an outsideƌ͛s seŶsiďilitǇ aŶd aŶ opeŶŶess 
to revisit policing strategies and leadership then they should not be selected. It should not be 
regarded as aŶ eŵďaƌƌassŵeŶt oƌ Đalled ͚Đhaos͛ oƌ ͚fiasĐo͛ if it is determined that none of the 
original candidates is quite right. The government should not be afraid of re-advertising the 
post if it needs to͛.  
In the same edition Sir Hugh Orde had a letteƌ puďlished uŶdeƌ the title ͚Tension between politicians 
aŶd poliĐe is healthǇ͛, in which he clarified  his position (Times, 18 August: 18):  
͚One of the foundation stones of British policing is Robert Peel's doctrine of constabulary 
independence. This insulates the police from political control and allows them to rely on their 
expertise, judgment and experience in their operations. But the essential counterpoint to this 
is public accountability – through the law, through the Home Secretary [at a national level] 
and through local representatives. But I am convinced there should be a healthy tension for 
these relationships to work.  
At the Cobra meetings last week to counter the riots, the Prime Minister and the Home 
Secretary ensured that there was strong oversight but that senior officers made the clear 
operational decisions. At no point did I say politicians were irrelevant: my point was that the 
more robust tactics we adopted did not come about through ministerial intervention but 
because chief constables had mobilised enough officers to change tactics. Both David 
Cameron and Theresa May were enormously supportive, and the Home Secretary clearly 
understands the complexity of policing and appreciates that we cannot get it right all the time. 
I think politicians would want it to be clear that they too understand the importance of a 
police service free of political interference  
Equally, the Government has an absolute right to reform accountability, which it aims to do 
through replacing police authorities with locally elected commissioners. But the police need 
clarity on how this will work, complete with effective checks and balances to keep the service 
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free of interference, as Peel intended. The impression has also been given that British policing 
believes it is immune to learning from outside or abroad. Neither is true. US policing has 
strong links with forces in the UK. I am a friend of Bill Bratton, I spent time with him in LA and 
invited him to speak at a conference in Northern Ireland in 2008. 
British policing has many strengths admired abroad: Peter Fahy, the Chief Constable of 
Greater Manchester, has been in demand in America to share the lessons of his force's 
success in tackling gangs. That is partly why police chiefs were surprised that they were not 
asked for their views before advice was sought from overseas. It is disappointing to see a 
mounting attack on British policing. We should be proud of our tried and tested model of 
policing – a largely unarmed service based on minimum force and minimum interference with 
citizens' rights – and we are determined to preserve it. But let no one think we are not open to 
challenge and change.͛ 
The Guardian, Independent, New Statesman and Daily Mirror all liŶed up to suppoƌt Oƌde͛s 
appointment. The Sunday Mirror suŵŵed up Oƌde͛s positioŶ: the stoƌǇ headliŶed, ͚Met Boss?: 
AŶǇoŶe But Hugh͛, ǁas folloǁed ǁith a poŶdeƌiŶg ďut poiŶted editoƌial: ͚It is hard to know which is 
more embarrassing for the government – with hours to go only one person had applied to be 
BƌitaiŶ͛s top poliĐe offiĐeƌ, oƌ that the sole appliĐaŶt ǁas soŵeoŶe Daǀid Cameron desperately 
doesŶ͛t ǁaŶt͛ (Sunday Mirror, 21 August: 14).  
None of the alternative candidates at this point received either unanimous or particularly vocal 
support across the conservative press. Conservative consensus was established around the 
unsuitability of Orde. It was this aggressively anti-Orde stance that set the tone for debate, and 
sought systematically to undermine the highlǇ eǆpeƌieŶĐed poliĐe Đhief͛s credibility as a potential 
Commissioner. The Sunday Telegraph (21 August) ran an exclusive on the chaotic nature of the 
application process, and quoted a Hoŵe OffiĐe souƌĐe statiŶg: ͚People were panicking a lot at the 
laĐk of appliĐaŶts aŶd theƌe ǁas a faiƌ ďit of ͚ĐhiǀǀǇiŶg up͛ takiŶg plaĐe. No-one likes Hugh Orde, 
eǀeŶ though he͛s pƌoďaďlǇ the ďest Đoppeƌ out of the lot of theŵ. The iŶitial iŶdiĐatioŶ ǁas that 
there would be just one applicant and that was Hugh Orde. By all accounts that did cause concern, 
shaƌed ďǇ No ϭϬ͛. The Sunday Telegraph͛s editorial highlighted the need for radical change, and 
explicitly challenged Oƌde͛s suitability for the Commissionership by portraying him as change-averse. 
The Mail on Sunday personalised its attack by focusing on Orde͛s teleǀisioŶ appeaƌaŶĐes iŶ a ͚fake͛ 
uniform with a ͚ŵade up͛ plastiĐ ďadge. The stoƌǇ disclosed the ǀieǁs of a ͚seŶioƌ poliĐe souƌĐe͛ 
(Mail on Sunday, 21 August: 17):  
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The sight of Sir Hugh on TV wearing the made-up uniform has bewildered and puzzled senior 
officers. This uniform does not belong to any police force. It has no constitutional or legal 
basis, especially the hat he wears. Instead of the tƌaditioŶal Đƌest, he͛s put aŶ ACPO ďadge oŶ 
it. It looks ŵade up, like a tƌaffiĐ ǁaƌdeŶ͛s uŶifoƌŵ. 
Former MPS Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Brian Paddick, was also quoted: ͚He is sending a clear 
signal: How would I look in the Met CoŵŵissioŶeƌ͛s uŶifoƌŵ?͛ ;iďidͿ. The aƌtiĐle ended by reminding 
readers that Orde was not an operational officer but the head of ACPO, an already discredited 
organisation. Attacks on Orde continued throughout the following weeks. The London Evening 
Standard further ridiculed Oƌde͛s pƌofessioŶal attiƌe ǁith a stoƌǇ headliŶed ͚Oh, hoǁ we love a man 
iŶ a fake uŶifoƌŵ͛ (23 August: 20): ͚Soŵe aƌe suggestiŶg that Siƌ Hugh͛s deĐisioŶ to ǁeaƌ his Gadaffi 
style pretend uniform on television is a subliminal pitch for the next Met CoŵŵissioŶeƌ͛s joď͛. On 2 
September, the Times ƌepoƌted Hugh Oƌde͛s deĐisioŶ to ǁed as a ĐǇŶiĐal atteŵpt to ŵake hiŵ 
acceptable to the Home Office. Two days later the Sunday Times (4 September 2011) accused him of 
running a blatant media campaign to be elected that included exaggerating his competence and 
experience.  
The following weekend the news media continued to publish leaks and gossip about the candidates 
who, as a result of last minute changes, would be interviewed by Mayor of London Boris Johnson 
and Home Secretary Theresa May on Monday 12 September. The appointment process was judged 
to be completely politicised. It was confirmed that the candidates had already been interviewed 
twice, by a Home Office panel comprising civil servants and advisors (2 September 2011) and by a 
panel of the Metropolitan Police Authority (6 September 2011). It should now have been left to the 
Home Secretary to decide. However, given that the previous two Commissioners had resigned in 
controversial circumstances, the Mayor was determined to have the final say on Sir Paul 
StepheŶsoŶ͛s suĐĐessoƌ. 
The inferential structure that Orde could not be the next Commissioner, ƌeiŶfoƌĐed ďǇ his ͚tƌial ďǇ 
ŵedia͛ over several weeks in the conservative press, was now fully crystallised. Even his press 
supporters were resigned to debating why he would not be successful in his application. The 
Independent on Sunday (11 September) focused on the political reasons why Sir Hugh Orde would 
not be appointed, despite a ͚consensus͛ that he was the ͚staŶd out ĐaŶdidate͛ foƌ the 
commissionership. In addition to the now well-ƌeheaƌsed pƌoďleŵs of Oƌde͛s clashing with the Home 
Secretary over the riots, and his outspoken criticisms of David Cameron for supporting Bill Bratton, 
Oƌde͛s Đlose assoĐiatioŶ ǁith NoƌtheƌŶ IƌelaŶd also eŵeƌged as a pƌoďleŵ. An un-named Home 
Office source explained: ͚They now say that, while he was effective over there, giving the job to 
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someone who made his name in charge of a force engaged in handling public disturbances every day 
would look like panic. It would send out the wrong message – that the Met was now some 
paramilitary organisation and it needed an experienced hand in charge. It's a pretty lame excuse, but 
when you would prefer to give the job to almost anyone else, it is the sort of reasoning that helps 
Ǉouƌ Đase͛ ;Independent on Sunday, 11 September: 20). 
For the Sunday Times there was a power struggle in play. The MPA had supported Orde and Hogan-
Howe, the Mayor was supporting Hogan-Howe, whilst the Home Secretary was supporting House. 
The Sunday Times (11 September 2011) profile of the candidates was as follows:  
 Hogan-Howe: ͚ A blunt-talking Yorkshireman, many see him as an ideal choice to steady the 
Met, which has been criticised over the London riots and phone hacking͛.  House: ͚An expert on gangs, he is considered a front-runner because the Home Office invited 
him to apply͛.   Orde: ͚is said to have told colleagues he does not expect to win the job. He is considered by 
many to be the most experienced, having served as chief constable in Northern Ireland for 
seven years. However, as president of ACPO, the Đhief ĐoŶstaďles' ͚uŶioŶ͛, he has clashed 
with [Home Secretary, Theresa] May over last month's riots͛.  Godwin: ͚He would normally be expected to be a certainty for the post, but many Tories 
have been critical of his handling of the disorder in London͛. 
The Mail on Sunday (11 September 2011) ideŶtified HogaŶ Hoǁe, the ͚former gang-busting police 
chief nicknamed ͚Eliot Ness͛ for his zero-tolerance on gun and knife crime͛, as the Home 
SeĐƌetaƌǇ͛s pƌefeƌƌed candidate. Tucked away in an article in the Sunday Telegraph (11 September 
2011) on the budgetary challenges facing the Chancellor of the Exchequer was a passing negative 
reference to the fact that police chiefs such as Sir Hugh Orde had ͚joined Labour in using the riots 
to justify asking the government to cancel cuts to police budgets͛.  
On Monday 12 September, the day of the interviews, both the Times and the Guardian ran pieces on 
the likely outcome of the deliberations. The Times confirmed that the Home Secretary was in favour 
Stephen House, while the Mayor of London was impressed by Bernard Hogan Howe. It reiterated 
that Siƌ Hugh Oƌde, ͚the ŵost eǆpeƌieŶĐed͛ ĐaŶdidate, had ͚angered senior government figures by 
speaking out over cuts and other policing issues͛. Tim Godwin's application had been seriously 
͚tarnished͛ by criticisms of the ineffective policing of the riots, and his association with Sir Paul 
Stephenson. The Guardian ran an exclusive maintaining that, although Sir Hugh Orde had been 
ranked as number one by both panels, he ǁould Ŷot ďe appoiŶted CoŵŵissioŶeƌ ďeĐause of ͚his 
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vocal opposition to the government's desire to radically reform poliĐiŶg͛. It confirmed that Bernard 
Hogan-Howe was the firm favourite with Stephen House in second place. The Guardian quoted an 
unnamed source as saying, ͚He is the chief spokesman for the way things have been, and the 
government wants to shake thiŶgs up͛. On the afternoon of Monday 12 September 2011 the Home 
Office confirmed that Bernard Hogan-Howe would be the new Commissioner of the London 
Metropolitan Police. 
 
Conclusion: The Legitimation of Bernard Hogan Howe? 
During his first interview as Commissioner Bernard Hogan-Howe was flanked – and interpellated  – 
by the Home Secretary and the Mayor of London as he faced a pack of reporters outside New 
Scotland Yard. The Home Secretary commended the new Commissioner for his ͚excellent track 
record as a tough, single minded crime fighter. He showed that in his time as Chief Constable of 
Merseyside. And I am sure that he is going to bring those skills and that ability to fight crime to the 
MetƌopolitaŶ PoliĐe͛ ;Daily Telegraph, 12 September 2011). The Mayor concurred that Hogan-Howe 
had been appointed because of his ͚ƌeleŶtless foĐus͛ oŶ ͚dƌiǀiŶg doǁŶ Đƌiŵe͛ ǁhile he was Chief 
Constable of Merseyside. In effect he was being characterised by the Home Secretary and Mayor as 
the British Bill Bratton. Hogan-Howe did not depart from the ͚Đƌiŵe fightiŶg͛ script (BBC News, 12 
September): 
͚I intend to lead the Metropolitan Police so that it makes criminals fear, that it keeps the trust 
of the public of London in the Metropolitan Police, and finally the Metropolitan Police that 
MetƌopolitaŶ poliĐe offiĐeƌs aŶd staff aƌe pƌoud of… And now I would like to go and start work 
but particularly to remember that the idea is to make the criminals fear the police and what 
they are doing now and make sure that they are stopping increased crime and reduce crime 
oǀeƌ the ĐoŵiŶg Ǉeaƌ… My job is to get crime down, arrest criminals and support victims. 
That͛s eǆaĐtlǇ ǁhat ǁe͛ƌe paid to do aŶd that͛s ǁhat I iŶteŶd to do.͛  
The folloǁiŶg daǇ͛s Ŷeǁspapeƌ headliŶes ƌepƌoduĐed the ͚Đƌiŵe-fighteƌ͛ Ŷaƌƌatiǀe in an uncritical 
manner: 
͚Met goes ͚ďaĐk to ďasiĐs͛ ǁith Ŷeǁ ĐoŵŵissioŶeƌ͛, Times, 13 September, p. 6 
͚New Top Cop: I will strike fear in Crims͛ , Sun, 13 September, p. 14 
͚On his Met-tle͛, Daily Mirror, 13 September, p.10 
͚Total war on crime made him Tory favourite͛, Guardian, 13 September, p. 12 
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͚Neǁ Met Đhief: We͛ll get Tough͛, Daily Express, 13 September, p. 18. 
͚CƌiŵiŶals ŵust feaƌ the poliĐe agaiŶ ǀoǁs the Yaƌd͛s Ŷeǁ Đhief͛, Daily Mail, 13 September, 
p. 7 
͚I͛ll ŵake the Met a foƌĐe that ĐƌiŵiŶals feaƌ, pledges Ŷeǁ CoŵŵissioŶeƌ͛, Daily Telegraph, 
13 September, p. 2 
͚Merseyside gangbuster gets a new beat as head of Met͛, Independent 13 September, p2. 
Despite similar headlines there was a clear political split in the press editorial response to the 
appointment. The selection of a self-declared, unequivocal ͚Đƌiŵe fighteƌ͛ was positively received 
across the centre-right press. The Sun gave him the most enthusiastic endorsement: ͚Be afraid, 
criminals. Be very afraid. That is the message from new Met Police chief Bernard Hogan-Howe. As 
Merseyside chief constable, he cut crime by 40 per cent. He promises similar action to clean up 
London. The Sun will be oŶ his side. Giǀe 'eŵ hell, guǀ͛ (13 September: 9).  
However, for the Independent, Guardian and Daily Mirror (13 September) the decision not to 
appoint Orde was reprehensible because, for these newspapers, it had been based on party 
political machinations rather than merit and ability. Sir Hugh Orde should have been appointed 
because of his unmatched operational and managerial experience and professional resolve to 
resist the politicisation of policing. The IŶdepeŶdeŶt’s position was that the most sophisticated 
senior police officer of his generation had, in effect, been publicly humiliated by the Conservative 
Party. For the Guardian the constitutionally unwarranted politicisation of the selection process 
had Ŷot oŶlǇ tƌashed Oƌde͛s staŶdiŶg, ďut also placed Hogan-Howe in ͚an unenviable position. 
Through no fault of his own, he will be labelled the Tories' placeman. No Met commissioner in 
modern times has come to the job with less authority or legitimacy. All this makes the new 
commissioner's job even more difficult than it would have been anyway... Mr Hogan-Howe has 
our best wishes, but he has ďeeŶ haŶded a poisoŶed ĐhaliĐe͛ ;GuaƌdiaŶ, ϭϯ Septeŵďeƌ ϮϬϭϭͿ. The 
Daily Mirror’s (13 September 2011) opinion ǁas that the Ŷeǁ CoŵŵissioŶeƌ ǁould haǀe ͚his 
work cut out restoring the authority of the Commissioner's office he will occupy. And to do that, 
he must ƌesist politiĐal iŶteƌfeƌeŶĐe… Parliament makes the laws. The police, not political 
aŵateuƌs, ŵust eŶfoƌĐe theŵ͛.  
BeƌŶaƌd HogaŶ Hoǁe͛s ĐoŵŵissioŶeƌship ǁill ďe liǀed out iŶ aŶ eǆaĐtiŶg high-risk policing domain of 
profound political and socio-economic transformations and a rapidly evolving news mediascape. He 
has to rebuild morale in a police force whose public credibility has been further destabilised by a 
series of high-profile public order policing mistakes that culminated in the controversial handling of 
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the summer riots of 2011. ͚LosiŶg ďǇ appeaƌiŶg to lose͛ is Ŷot a politiĐallǇ ǀiaďle puďliĐ oƌdeƌ poliĐiŶg 
philosophy. In addition, the issue of the extent and nature of MPS  relationships with News 
International will be subject to intense news media and political and possibly court scrutiny during 
2012. EǆteŶdiŶg ‘eiŶeƌ͛s ;ϭϵϵϭͿ ĐlassiĐ tǇpologǇ of poliĐe Đhiefs, HogaŶ-Howe is, as his recent 
pƌedeĐessoƌs haǀe ďeeŶ, a ͚ŵediatised poliĐe Đhief͛. And of course the news media will be quick to 
judge Hogan Howe͛s ability to deliver on his ͚Đƌiŵe fightiŶg͛ pledge to LoŶdoŶeƌs, in addition to his 
adeptness in managing the roll out of a radical police reform programme and resisting government 
cuts in the MPS budget. Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe will be aware that his position in the news media 
͚hierarchy of credibilitǇ͛ is ĐoŶtiŶgeŶt, aŶd that a Đaƌeeƌ-wrecking ͚tƌial ďǇ ŵedia͛ Đould ďegiŶ at aŶǇ 
moment. He will no doubt also ďe aǁaƌe of Siƌ Hugh Oƌde͛s pƌophetiĐ ǁoƌds: ͚You are truly, as a 
chief officer, only as good as Ǉouƌ last fiǀe ŵiŶutes͛.  
  
20 
 
References 
Bahktin, M. (1968) Rabelais and his World, Boston: MIT Press.  
BaƌŶett, S. ;ϮϬϬϮͿ ͚Will a Cƌisis iŶ JouƌŶalisŵ Pƌoǀoke a Cƌisis iŶ DeŵoĐƌaĐǇ͛, Political Quarterly, 73, 4: 
400-408.  
BeĐk, U. ;ϮϬϬϲͿ ͚LiǀiŶg iŶ the Woƌld ‘isk SoĐietǇ͛, Economy and Society, 35:3: 329-45.  
BeĐkeƌ, H. ;ϭϵϲϳͿ ͚Whose Side aƌe ǁe OŶ?͛, Social Problems, 14, 3: 234-247.  
BeĐkeƌ, H. ;ϭϵϲϳͿ ͚Whose Side aƌe ǁe OŶ?͛, Social Problems, 14, 3: 234-247.  
Bratton, W. (1998) TurŶarouŶd: Hoǁ Aŵerica’s Top Cop Reǀersed the Criŵe Epidemic, New York, 
Random House.  
Castells, M. (2009) Communication Power, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Chermak, S., and Weiss, A. (2005), ͚MaiŶtaiŶiŶg Legitimacy Using External Communication 
Strategies: An Analysis of Police-Media RelatioŶs͛, Journal of Criminal Justice, 33, 5: 501-512. 
Chibnall, S. (1977), Law and Order News: An Analysis of Crime Reporting in the British Press. London: 
Tavistock. 
Chƌistie, N. ;ϭϵϴϲͿ ͚Suitaďle EŶeŵǇ͛, iŶ H. BiaŶĐhi aŶd ‘. VaŶ SǁaaŶiŶgeŶ ;eds.Ϳ Abolitionism: 
Towards a Non-Repressive Approach to Crime, Amsterdam: Free University Press, pp43-54.  
Debord, G. (1970) The Society of the Spectacle, London: Black and Red.  
Deuze, Mark. (2008) ͚The ChaŶgiŶg Natuƌe of Neǁs Woƌk: LiƋuid JouƌŶalisŵ aŶd MoŶitoƌial 
Citizenship͛, International Journal of Communication 2, 5: 848-865.  
Dogan, M. and Seid, M. (eds.) (2005) Political Mistrust and the Discrediting of Policians, New York: 
Brill.  
Ericson, R. and Haggerty, K. (1997) Policing the Risk Society, University of Toronto Press, Toronto. 
Ericson, R., Baranek, P and Chan, J. (1991) Representing Order: Crime, Law and Justice in the News 
Media, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.  
Ericson, R., Baranek, P. M., and Chan, J. (1989), Negotiating Control: A Study of News Sources, 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Fenton, N. (2009) New Media, Old News: Journalism and Democracy in the Digital Age, London: 
Sage.  
FoƌsǇth, J. ;ϮϬϭϭͿ ͚CaŵeƌoŶ ŵustŶ͛t let the poliĐe top ďƌass ďullǇ hiŵ iŶto sileŶĐe͛, Spectator,  14 
August. 
Fukuyama, F. (2000) Trust: the Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, New York, Diane. 
21 
 
Gƌeeƌ, C. aŶd MĐLaughliŶ, E. ;ϮϬϭϭaͿ ͚Tƌial ďǇ Media: PoliĐiŶg, the Ϯϰ-7 News Mediasphere, and the 
PolitiĐs of Outƌage͛, Theoretical Criminology, 15, 1: 23-46.  
Greer, C. and McLaughlin, E. (2011b) ͚This is Ŷot JustiĐe: IaŶ ToŵliŶsoŶ, IŶstitutioŶal Failuƌe aŶd the 
Pƌess PolitiĐs of Outƌage͛, in British Journal of Criminology, 52, 6 (Online First, November 
2011).  
Gƌeeƌ, C. aŶd MĐLaughliŶ, E. ;ϮϬϭϬͿ ͚We PƌediĐt a ‘iot: Puďlic Order Policing, New Media 
EŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶts aŶd the ‘ise of the CitizeŶ JouƌŶalist͛, iŶ British Journal of Criminology, 50, 6: 
1041-1059. 
Greer, C. and Reiner, R. (2012Ϳ ͚Mediated Mayhem: Media, Crime and Criminal JustiĐe͛, iŶ M. 
Maguire, R. Morgan and R. Reiner (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Criminology, fifth edition, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Guardian (2011) ͚Orde likely to miss out on top Met job despite backing from panel: candidates to be 
grilled by May and Johnson today͛, Guardian, 12 September, [V.Dodd and S.Lavill], p.10.  
Hall, S. Critcher, C. Jefferson, T. Clarke, J. and Roberts, B. (1978) Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the 
State and Law and Order, London: Macmillan. 
Halloran, J., Elliott, P. and Murdock, G (1970) Demonstrations and Communication: A Case Study. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Home Affairs Committee (2009) Fourth Report – Policing Process of Home Office Leaks Enquiry 
(available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmhaff/157/15702.htm)  
HuttoŶ, W. ;ϮϬϬϬͿ ͚Neǀeƌ MiŶd the FaĐts, Let͛s Haǀe a SĐaŶdal͛, iŶ Observer, 15th October, page 30.  
Independent on Sunday ;ϮϬϭϭͿ  ͚So, just ǁhat has Daǀid CaŵeƌoŶ got agaiŶst the Đoppeƌ͛s Đoppeƌ?͛ 
[B.Brady and K.Dutta] Independent on Sunday 11 September 2011. p.20. 
Katz, J. ;ϭϵϴϳͿ ͚What Makes Cƌiŵe Neǁs͛, iŶ Media, Culture and Society, 9, 1: 47-76. 
Lang, G. and Lang, K. (1983) The Battle for Public Opinion, New York: Columbia University Press.  
LaŶg, K. aŶd LaŶg, G. ;ϭϵϱϱͿ ͚The IŶfeƌeŶtial StƌuĐtuƌe of PolitiĐal CoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs: A StudǇ iŶ 
UŶǁittiŶg Bias͛, Public Opinion Quarterly, 19, 2: 168-183.  
Loadeƌ, I. aŶd MulĐahǇ, A. ;ϮϬϬϭďͿ ͚The Poǁeƌ of Legitiŵate NaŵiŶg paƌt II - Making Sense of the 
Elite PoliĐe VoiĐe͛, British Journal of Criminology, 41, 2: 252-265. 
Loadeƌ, I. aŶd MulĐahǇ, A. ;ϮϬϬϭaͿ ͚The Poǁeƌ of Legitiŵate NaŵiŶg Paƌt I - Chief Constables as 
Social Commentators in Post-Waƌ EŶglaŶd͛, British Journal of Criminology, 41, 1: 41-55. 
Mail on Sunday ;ϮϬϭϭͿ Ϯ. ͚MaŶ theǇ Đall ͚Elliot Ness͛ is tipped as Met Đhief͛  ϭϭ Septeŵďeƌ, [C. 
Leake]. p.43. 
MaŶŶiŶg, P.K. ;ϮϬϬϭͿ ͚TheoƌisiŶg Policing: Drama and Myth of Crime CoŶtƌol iŶ the NYPD͛, 
Theoretical Criminology, 5, 3,  315-44. 
22 
 
MaǁďǇ, ‘. ;ϮϬϭϬͿ ͚ChiďŶall ‘eǀisited: Cƌiŵe ‘epoƌteƌs, the PoliĐe aŶd ͚Laǁ-and-Oƌdeƌ Neǁs͛, iŶ 
British Journal of Criminology, 50, 6: 1060-1076.  
Mawby, R.C. (ϮϬϬϮͿ ͚CoŶtiŶuitǇ aŶd ChaŶge, CoŶǀeƌgeŶĐe aŶd DiǀeƌgeŶĐe: the PoliĐǇ aŶd PƌaĐtiĐe of 
Police-Media ‘elatioŶs͛, Criminal Justice, 2, 3: 303-24. 
MaǁďǇ, ‘.C. ;ϮϬϬϮaͿ ͚CoŶtiŶuitǇ aŶd ĐhaŶge, ĐoŶǀeƌgeŶĐe aŶd diǀeƌgeŶĐe: the poliĐǇ aŶd pƌaĐtiĐe of 
police-media relatioŶs͛, Criminal Justice, vol.2, no.3, pp.303-24. 
McLaughlin, E. (2007) The New Policing, London, Sage. 
Milne, K. (2005) Manufacturing Dissent: Single-issue Protest, the Public and the Press, London: 
Demos. 
Pavlik, J. (2008) Media in the Digital Age, New York: New York University Press. 
Protess, D., Cook, F., Doppelt, J., Eterma, J., Gordon, M., Leff, D. and Miller, P. (1991) The Journalism 
of Outrage: Investigative Reporting and Agenda Building in America, New York, Guildhall 
Press. 
Reiner, R. (1991) Chief Constables: Bobbies, Bosses or Bureaucrats? Oxford: Clarendon.  
Reiner, R. (2000) The Politics of the Police, third edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Sabato, L. (1993) Feeding Frenzy: How Attack Journalism has transformed American Politics, New 
York, Free Press.  
Sabato, L., Stencel, M., and Lichter, S. (2000) Peep Show: Media and Politics in an Age of Scandal, 
New York, Rowman and Littlfield. 
Schlesinger, P and Tumber, H. (1994) Reporting Crime: the Politics of Criminal Justice, Oxford, 
Clarendon. 
Sunday Times ;ϮϬϭϭͿ ͚Boƌis aŶd MaǇ tussle oǀeƌ Met Đhief͛, Sunday Times,  11 September, [D. 
Leppard] p.12.  
Times (2011) ͚Riots role could decide Met job͛ [F. Hamilton] 12 September, p.24 
 
 
 
 
